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Abstract
Newspapers and weekly magazine catering to the investing crowd often rank
funds according to the returns generated in the past. Aside from satisfying
sheer curiosity, these numbers are probably also the basis on which investors
pick a fund to invest in. In this article, we fully characterize the equilibrium in
a game between a mutual fund manager of unknown ability who controls the
riskiness of his portfolio and investors who only observe realized returns. We
derive conditions under which (i) investors invest in the fund if the realized
return falls within some interval, i.e., is neither too low nor too high, (iá) a
good mutual fund manager picks a portfolio of minimal riskiness and (iiá) a
bad mutual fund manager will pick a portfolio with higher risk, "gambling" on
a lucky outcome. We also show that regulating the maximum risk a mutual
fund is allowed to take may actually decrease rather than increase the expected
return to investors, even if the mazket price of risk is zero: the regulation ends
up forcing the investor to pick the bad fund more often.
Keywords: Heterogenous abilities, Interval of performances, Portfolio riskiness.
JEL Classification: D82, D84, G20.
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1 Introduction
Newspapers and weekly magazine catering to the investing crowd often prodiice ta-
bles showing "rat races" of mutual fimds. They rank fimds according to the retitrns
generated in the previous year or over a period of several years. Aside from satisfying
sheer ciuiosity, these numbers are probably also the basis on which investors pick a
fund to invest in. Empirical work shows that flows in and out of fimds are indeed pos-
itively correlated with past performances (see See Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tuffano
(1993), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Lettau (1997)).
Should smart investors biry funds with high returns in the past? To answer this
question, we shall biuld on the premise that mutual fund managers differ in their
ability to generate high returns, and that these abilities are persistent at least in the
short run so that retttrns in yeaz t can be indicative of performances in year t f 1
(See Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Hendrick, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Brown
and Goetzmann(1995) and Cazhart (1997)1). Mutual fund managers with asset,
based compensation schemes2 aze surely aware of the signalling fimction of their past
performance, and will tht~s choose their portfolio strategies accordingly. For the sake
of the argiunent, suppose, that investors always pick the fimd which generated the
highest return in the past. Knowing this, a fimd manager with an inferior ability
may be tempted to gamble, i.e. to invest in risky portfolios, hoping to generate the
highest return in the crowd. But if that is indeed the case, high past returns are
not indicative of high ability: rather, they indicate overly risky portfolios. Smart
investors shoiild thiis avoid the top-performing fimds.
The contribution of this paper is not only to make this intuition precise, but. to
fiilly characterize the equilibritun in a game between a mutual fimd manager and
investors, when only returns are observable. We assume that mutual fund managers
can be either bad or good, and are thus able to realize either a low or a high return on
investment on average. Mutiial fund managers control the riskineas of their portfolio.
The investors observe a realization of the fund retiun, and invest in the fund, if it is
stifficiently likely that the mutual fund manager is good. The manager will choose
the riskiness of his to-be-observed portfolio return in order to ma~cimize the chance
that the invest.or will invest with him.
We obtain the following results, summarized in Theorem 1. Under some conditions
~Evidence of persistent under-petformance seem to be atronger than that of over-performance
ZSee Khorana (1996, section 2)
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on the parameters of oiu model, the investor will invest in the fund, if the realized
retrun falls within some interval, i.e., is neither too low nor too high. A good mutual
fund manager picks a portfolio of minimal riskiness. A bad mutual firnd manager will
pick a portfolio with higher risk, "gambling" on a lucky outcome.
Such restilts are consistent with those of Carhart (1997) who shows that "the
funds in the top decile differ substantially each year, with more than 80 percent an-
nual turnover in the composition. In addition, last year's winners frequently become
next year's losers and vice versa, which is consistent with gambling behavior by mii-
tual fimds".
We also show that regiilating the maximum risk a mutual fund is allowed to take
may actually decrease rather than increase the expected return to investors, even if
the market price of risk is zero: the regiilation ends iip forcing the investor to pick
the bad fund more often.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related literatiue. Section 3
provides a simple two-qirality model, and provides the key results in theorems 1 and
2. Section 4 provides analyzes a more general framework. Section 5 studies some
numerical examples. Section 6 investigat.es the effects of regtilating mutual fiind
riskiness. section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is siibstantially different. from the existing literattue. In patticular, the
upper boimd is the novel featiue of oiu paper. The most related models are those of
Huddart (1999), Palomino (1998), Palomino and Prat (1998), and Raahauge (1999).
Huddart (1999) studies a two-period model in which, at the end of the first period,
risk-averse investors reallocate their wealth between two firnds after having observed
the performance of each fiind. It is shown that. in the first, both an informed and an
uninformed fimd choose overly risky investment strategies; and in the second period
investors should always invest in the 5md that has realized the higher return in the
first period.
There are several differences between Huddart's model and ours. First, Huddart
assiunes that portfolios are observable while we do not. Huddart's assumption implies
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that he stiidies a standard signalling model in which some additional information is
given by realized returns. If portfolios are not observable, as in our model, managers'
skills can only be derived from statistical inference. Fttrthermore, we do not find
the asstunption of observable portfolios very appealing since managers window-dress
their portfolio arotmd disclostue dates in practice (see Lakonishok, Thaler, Shleifer
and Vishny (1991) in the case of pension fimds and Mtisto (1999) in the case of taxable
money fimds). Second, Huddart's asstunption makes it very "easy" for an uninformed
manager to obtain exactly the same return as an informed manager. Hence, there is
not much information an investor can gather from observed retttrns.
Palomino (1998) and Palomino and Prat (1998) foctts on the consequences of the
tuse of relative performance as a fimd picking device by investors. Palomino shows
that with imperfectly competitive market, relative performance objectives lead to
both overly-risky investment and herding in the acquisition of information. Palomino
and Prat analyze the competition between two money managers over two investment
periods in a competitive environment when managers observe performances at the end
of the first period while investors do not. They show that in fust period, managers
maximize their expected return. In the second period, if managers have ranking-based
objectives (as in a tournament), they do not maximize their expected rettirn.
The main difference between these two models and otus is that they consider a
more complex game played by managers (either market power or multiple investment
decision) but take the behaviottr of investors as given. Conversely, we study a model in
which managers are price takers and make only one investment dec.ision but investors
are strategic agents.
Finally, Raahauge, in the sixth chapter of his thesis (1999), investigates the ability
of the principal-agent problem between investors and mutual fimd managers to ac-
cotmt for the observed equity premitun. In contrast to us, a"gamble for resurection"
after the first half of a period is key in his model. Ftuthermore, he does not actually
characterize the equilibritun.
Other papers such as Das and Sundazam (1998a) have focussed on e.g. the fee
structtue as a way to signal skills. Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) aLso analyze the
interplay between a portfolio manager and an investor: there, the focus is to extract.
the right effort from the manager by conditioning a continued relationship on the
observed return.
On the empirical side, investors' smartness in ftmd picking has been studied by
Grttber (1996) and Zhen (1999). Both articles show that newly invested money per-
forms better than the entire stock of money invested in actively managed funds. How-
3
ever, newly invested money in actively managed equity fimds imderperforms index
fimds. This suggests that investors' ability to select fimds is rather limited. Massa
(1997) shows that the fimd-picking by investors is dictated by their position on a
relative ranking of fimds performances rather than the absolute valtre of the retirrn
generated by the funds: the latter is insignificant, if the former is included. This
lends mild empirical support to Theorem 1: if retirrns are already sufficiently high to
land you on top of the heap, it does not help to achieve even higher returns3.
3 The Model
There is a single mutual fimd and a continuum of investors. The mutual fimd manager
is of good quality with some probability z(i and of bad quality with probability 1- t~.
The muttral fimd manager picks a portfolio, which generates the rettrrn
R- ~L -} QE, E~~(O~ 1) (1)
We assume that p- pb if the manager is of bad quality, and p-~9 1~b, if the
manager is of good quality. In picking the portfolio, the mutual fund manager only
controls the riskiness a~ o~ 0 of the portfolio. Le., the mutual fimd manager
cannot reduce the risk in his portfolio below some positive lower bound, but he can
add as much risk as he wants. For simplicity, we have assiuned that the market price
of this risk is zero, i.e., that changing the riskiness of the portfolio does not affect its
mean retiun. This is not restrictive in principle: if there is a market price for risk,
rewrite everything in risk-adjusted terms, i.e. do a change of ineasiire so that assets
can be compared by comparing their expected retirrns only, using the new measure.
Of course, while this is a standard and elegant procedtue in theory, it may makes
comparisons to the data tricky.
The investors only observe the return, but not the choice a or the quality of
the manager. Based on the observed rettrrn, the investors calctilate the probability
P( "g" ~ R) that the mutual fund manager is indeed of good quality. They will invest.
in the fund, if that probability exceeds some treshold r E(0,1), which we take to be
an exogenous parameter of the model. The mutual fund manager aims at maximizing
the probability that the investors invest with him. Note that all investors have the
same information and make the same decision. We are interested in the sequential
3We are grateful to Massimo Massa for pointing this out to us.
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equilibria of this game.
This is an extremely simple model aimed at providitig a more precise irnderpinning
of the intuition described in the introduction. For simplicity sake and on purpose,
the model ignores some potentially important aspects. First, the rather mechanical
decision by the investors shortctits a miich lengthier derivation of the portfolio choice
based on first principles in some multiperiod, miiltifimd model. Siich a derivation
wonld likely complicate the analysis in an unnecessary way. Second, the objective
of the mutual fimd manager can be underpinned by assuming that the mutual fiind
manager is paid on a percentage basis of the fimds tmder his management for some
second, unmodelled period. Again, this would only complicate the model. Third,
the parameters, in particular the treshold probability T are taken to be exogenoiLS,
although they may well be considered as endogenoius in a more complicated version of
the model: indeed, we will endogenize r later on, in Section 5. Finally, we have com-
pletely ignored an important miiltiperiod aspect: investors shorild take into accormt,
that the manager will have an incentive to signal good quality also in the future,
iusing the investors resources to do so. The latter provides for additional interesting
int,eractions which we hope to analyze in future work.
We analyze the game backwards, seazching for the eqtulibrium (ptue-strategy)
portfolio risks Q9 to be picked by the good manager and ay to be picked by the bad
manager.
In the last stage of the game, observing the realized rettun R and in knowledge
of the equilibrium strategies (a9, ab), the investors can calculate the likelihood ratio




s ( I ,~9„ )
- ~9e(R-vs)'~(~9')-(R-Na)'I(~6')
Q6
Using Bayes nile, the probability of good manager having realized the return R com-
putes to
P(„9„ I R) -
p(R I ,~9„)1,(~~9„)
p(R I „b„)P(~~b„) f P(R ~ ~,9„)P(,~9„)
~
~ f (1 - ~)L(R; a9, ~e)
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The investors invest with the fimd, if
P( "g„ ~ R) ~ r (2)
This is equivalent to demanding that the investor invest with the fiind, if the ex-post
expected return exceeds some treshold level ti ,
~,(,~g„ I R)pg f P(,~b„ ~ R)l~b ? l~'
provided, ~' and r satisfy the relationship




In sections 4 and 5, we will find the alternative formulation ( 3) more useful, but
we will stick with the "T"-fortmilation here.
Given the eqiulibrium strategies (v9,Qb), the fimd will now pick a so as to maxi-
mize his chances of receiving investors,
~maxP(,~ } (1 -,~)L(R;Qy,ab) ? T), (5)
where the return distribution of R depends both on a as well as on the qiiality of the
manager via the mean ~g or p,b, see eqnation (1).
A strategy pair ( a9, ab ) is an equ{librium, iff
O'~ - argmaxoP( ~ ~ T) s.t. R- px f ae, e ti N(0;1)
~G f (1 - ~G)L(R;QgrQb) -
for x- g, b. We aze now ready to state oi~r main restilts.
Theorem 1 Suppose, the parameters p,g, pb, g, ~i, r satisfy
({1920p6)z
i lOg ~~il- T) I i ~ (Ó)2 ~j J
Then there exists an equiltibrium (~r9,a6) urith the following features:
1. The good manager picks the minimal feasibde risk level, a9 - o-.
2. The óad manager picks a risk level, which is strictly greater than the feasible
minimum, ob ~ a.
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3. The investor invests in the fund, if the return R falls in the interual [R~, Rh] for
some bounds R~, Rh solving some quadratic equation, and satisfying
IrncRiCp9GRhcoo
The proof is in appendix A.
Theorem 2 Suppose, the parameters py,p,b,?,t,i,T 9atzsfy
log ~w(1-"~T' )~ 1 (~9-!lb)2 (7)` I - y, 2a2
Then there ezists an equilibríum (o9,a6) vrith the jollovnng features:
1. Both mnnagers pick the minimal feasible risk level, a9 - ob - o.
2. The investor invests in the fund, if the return R is larger than some threshold
~ unth
s~ - ~9 } lló - 02 10
~(1 - T) ~ (8)
2 !rs - Irb g ( 1 - ~ )
- ~c
The proof is in appendix A.
Theorem 1 stat.es that when the probability that a fimd manager is good is high
(the second inequality of (6) holds) and the difference of skills between a good and
a bad manager is large (the first inequality of (6) holds) then an investor should not
invest in the fund if its return is either too large or too small.
Figiue 1 ilh~strates this restilt (with the parameters of Table 2, row 1 in Section
5). The grey area and the bell-shaped line represent the densities of retiirn generat.ed
by a bad fimd manager and a good fimd manager, respectively. The two vertical
lines represent the lower and the iipper boimd (i.e., R~ and Rh) for realized retiuns
between which investors decide to invest in the fund.
(Insert Figiue 1]
The eqiulibrium proposed by Theorem 2 is more "conventional": pick the fimd
which generates the highest rettuns. The first inequality in (6) thus provides the
dividing line between a"naive" and a"sophisticated" reading of mntiial fimd retiirn
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rankings. Such fimd picking strategy shoiild be implemented when the fraction of
good fimd managers is large (the second inequality of (6) holds) and the skill difference
between good and bad managers is small (the first inequality of (6) does not hold).
Under the conditions of the two theorems above, there also is another eqtulibrium,
in which the investor always invests with the fimd, no matter what retirrn is observed:
this is discussed in appendix B.
4 The general case
The preceeding section concentrated on the highly restrictive case, that there are only
two types of qualities for the manager. We shall now proceed to the general case of
fairly arbitrary a priori qualities. Our aim is now more modest: we want to state
sufficient conditions under which we can rule out, that a smart investor shotild always
pick the fimd with the highest return, i.e. we want to state conditions, under which
the answer to the question in the title is negative.
Assume, that the quality of the manager is measured by the mean retiun p he
can achieve, which is drawn according to some prior probability measure ~r(dp) with
compact support L, ~]. The manager picks a within a given interval [v, ó], 0 c o- G~
and realizes the return
R-pfoe
where e~ N(0,1). The investor observes R and forms posterior beliefs ~rR for the
managerial quality lc. He will invest in the fimd iff
E~R [Ir] ? lr"
where p' is some treshold level retiirn.
Oiir general result is as follows.
Theorem 3 Suppose that, a priori,
En [~] ~ ~"
Then, for ó su,~ciently large, there is no equilibrium., in which the smart investor vrill
invest if R~ R for som,e R.
The proof is in appendix C. The theorem essentially says, that whenever it. is
not a good idea to buy the managed fimds a priori, then the investor shotild always
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interpret very large retiuns as a sign of a bad fitnd "gambling" rather than a sign
of good ability. Such a resiilt is consistent with those of Carhart (1997) on the
lack of persistence of top performance and on the gambling behavior of mutual fimd
managers.
One shotild note that the restilt above is consistent with Theorem 2. Note that
equation (7) implies
~G(1 - T) ~ 11-~
Replace r with (4) and rewrite the above equation as
~~9 } (1 - 7,1){L6 i 7~J{L~ } (1 - ~)~g
and observe that the right hand side is larger than ~c', since p9 mt~st be larger than
p' for this ineqiiality to have a chance to hold at all. Piit differently, the conditions
under which Theorem 2 hold, violate the conditions imder which Theorem 3 hold,
which is how it should be.
To gain further insights, quantitative, numerical examples are needed. This is
the purpose of the next section, in which we revert to the the two-quality situation,
envisioned in the previous section.
5 Some illustrative examples
This section provides some munerical examples to ilhistrate the natiue of the solution,
and to shed further light on our theory.
We consider a situation in the spirit of Ippolito (1992). The economy contains
two funds, an actively managed fimd which charges high management fees and an
index fimd which charges low management fees. Denote c the difference in fees and
pa the expecteQ retiun of the index fimd. We imagine that the investor chooses the
actively managed fimd if he expects to earn a higher retiun after fees than with the
index fimd,
P(~,9„IR)p9 f P(,~b„~R)F~a 1 l~~ - F~o f c
This is eqiuvalent to
P(,~9„ IR) ) Iro -t- c- Wa
i~9 - ~6
The treshold probability r can be calciilated with equation (4), restated here for
convenience:




The average yearly return of the SP500 over the period 1990-1998 is 1.17 and
standard deviation of this retirrn is 0.1414. So, in the following examples, we assiune
that po - 1.18.
Table 1 illustrates the effect of changes of ~e9 (everything else held equal) on the
variance of the portfolio chosen by a manager of type b ( oy), the boimds within
the investor pick the actively managed fund ( R~ and Rh), the probability that. the
investors chooses the actively managed fund ( P(I)), the probability that the investor
invets in a good fund P( "g" and I), the probability of having selected a good fund
given that an actively managed fund has been chosen (P("g"~I)) and the expected
return of investing E(Ret) given the probabilities P(I) and P("g"~I).
p9 pd ~ ob Ri Rh r P(I) P("g"and I) P("g"~I) E(Ret)
1.22 1.15 0.7 0.125 1.153 1.537 0.57 0.67 0.52 0.78 1.2
1.24 1.15 0.7 0.116 1.15 1.863 0.44 0.72 0.57 0.79 1.212
1.26 1.15 0.7 0.123 1.15 1.793 0.36 0.75 0.60 0.80 1.226
1.28 1.15 0.7 0.138 1.153 1.69 0.31 0.77 0.63 0.81 1.241
1.30 1.15 0.7 0.163 1.157 1.625 0.27 0.79 0.65 0.82 1.255
Table 1: po - 1.18, c- 0.01, a- 0.1
We observe that as p9 increases, the probability of selecting a fund of type "g"
given that an actively managed fiind has been selected increases. This is fairly in-
tuitive, the larger the difference in expected rettuns between bad and good fimds,
the easier it is for an investor to sort them out based on observed returns. The
effect on the portfolio volatility chosen by a manager of type "b" is imclear. The
reason is the following. If R~ decreases then ab decreases since the lower boimd gets
closer to tcb (Remember that for any set of parameters such that Theorem 1 holds,
R~ ~ p,b). Reciprocally, if a manager of type "b" decreases ab then investors will lower
Ri. Hence, an increase in py may result in a lower ob. Conversely, if investors increase
R~ as p9 increases, then the response of a manager of type "b" will be to increase
ob. Reciprocally, the best response of an investor to an increase of ~6 is to increase
R~. Table 1 illustrates that this can create a nonmonotonic relationship between the
exogenoi~s variable ~9 and the endogenotis values for vb, Ri and Rh.
Table 2 ilh~strates the influence of variations of ~i. We observe that as ~ increases,
os decreases. The reason is that the ex-ante probability for the investor of choosing
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a fimd of type "b" when investing in an actively managed fimd decreases. Therefore,
the investor can widen the interval of realizations of retiuns for which he chooses an
actively managed fimd, i.e., R~ decreases and R~ increases. It follows that a manager
of type "b" has less incentives to take a high level of risk. Hence, as ~ji increases, ab
decreases.
!~y {~a ~G ot Rr R~ r P(I) P("g"and I) P("g"~I) E(Ret)
1.30 1.15 0.6 0.179 1.182 1.554 0.27 0.69 0.52 0.76 1.241
1.30 1.15 0.65 0.173 1.169 1.583 0.27 0.74 0.59 0.79 1.2482
1.30 1.15 0.7 0.163 1.157 1.625 0.27 0.79 0.65 0.82 1.255
1.30 1.15 0.75 0.14 1.15 1.763 0.27 0.82 0.70 0.85 1.262
1.30 1.15 0.8 0.105 1.15 4.367 0.27 0.85 0.75 0.88 1.268
Table2: ~a-1.18,c-0.O1,a-0.1
Table 3 illustrates the insuence of ~b. The effects of variations of ~b are similar to
those produced by variations of ~9. For the set of parameters considered, we observe
that as pb increases, the difference Ri - pb decreases. As a consequence, a manager
of type "b" has less incentives to take risk and he decreases ab as a response to a
decrease of R~ -~.b. Now, the best response of an investor to a decrease of ob is
to decrease the difference Ri -~6. Again, the resulting behaviour of R~ and Rh is
nonmonotonic.
I~y I~b ~l~ ob Rr Rh r P(I) P("g"and I) P("g"~I) E(Ret)
1.24 1.06 0.7 0.214 1.149 1.432 0.72 0.64 0.55 0.86 1.206
1.24 1.09 0.7 0.187 1.148 1.452 0.67 0.67 0.56 0.84 1.207
1.24 1.12 0.7 0.159 1.145 1.491 0.58 0.70 0.58 0.82 1.21
1.24 1.15 0.7 0.116 1.15 1.863 0.44 0.72 0.57 0.79 1.212
Table 3: ~eo - 1.18, c- 0.01, v- 0.1
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6 Regulation issues
One may argue that the mutual fimd industry is highly regulated and that managers
do not have the freedom to choose a level of risk as high as they wottld wish given
their incentives. In other words, regulation impose an upper boimd ó on the level of
risk a manager can choose. A natural qirestion to ask is whether such a regttlation is
in the interest of investors, i.e., does the expected rettun from investment increases
when á decreases?
If the conditions of Theorem 1 are met, then if Q G ob, a manager of type "b"
will choose ob - á in equilibritun. Therefore, when choosing v, the regulator has to
take into accotmt the reaction of investors to a decrease of vb, since both Ri and Rh
are fimctions of ob.
Investors' expected return E(Ret) can be rewrítten as
E(Ret) - po f P("g"and I)({r9 -Wo) - P("b"and I)(pb - pa)
Hence, the expected return can be split into three pieces: the expected return of
the index fund, the gain from investing in a fimd of type "g" rather than in the index
fund and last, the cost of investing in a fund of type "b" rather than in the index
fund. The regtilation influences both P( "g"and I) and P( "b"and I), and is beneficial
(detrimental) to investors is the variation in gains (coets) generated by limiting the
riskiness of portfolios selected by managers exceeds the variation in costs (gains).
Analyzing the marginal impact of ó on E(Ret) analytically ttirns into a messy ex-
ercise without clear results. We resort to numerical ilh~stration instead. We provide
two examples showing that limiting the amoimt of risk a manager can take can either
incresse or decrease investors' expected return E(Ret).
In the first example, ti9 - 130, ~b - 115, t~ - 0.7 and all the other parameters are
as in the previous section. In such a case, in the absence of regtilation, ~b - 0.163
(see Table 1). As the maximum amount. of risk allowed decreases, the interval [R~, Rh]
"moves" in the direction of higher returns (see Figttres 2 and 3). A direct consequence
is that both the probability of investing in a fimd of type "b" and the probability of
investing in a ftmd of type "g" decrease (see, Figures 4 and 5, respectively). Hence,
the regulation decreases both the gain from investing in a good fimd and the cost of
investing in a bad fimd. In this example, the reduction in gains exceeds the reduction
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of costs and the net effect is a lower expected retiun for investors (Figtue 6). There-
fore, limiting the level of risk a manager of type "b" takes is welfare decreasing.
[Insert Figures 2 to 6]
In the second example we consider, ~9 - 130, ~cb - 86, ~i - 0.8 and all the other
parameters are as in the previous section. In such a case, in absence of regiilation
ob - 0.4465. As Figure 7 illustrates, R~ is not monotonic in á. However, for a large
reduction in the maximum level of risk, Ri decreases, Rh increases (Figiue 8), the
probability of investing in funds of type "b" decreases (Figure 9) and the probability
of investing in a fund of type "g" increases (Figure 10). The direct conseqiience is an
increase of investors' expected return (Figure 11). In such a case, a regulation limit-
ing strongly the maximum amount of risk managers can take is beneficial to investors.
[Insert Figures 7 to 11]
7 Conclusion
This paper provided a simple, highly stylized theory of the game between a mutual
fund manager and a collection of investors. Mutual fund managers can be either bad
or good, and are thus able to realize either a low or a high retiun on investment on
average. Mtitual fund managers control the riskiness of their portfolio. The investors
observe a realization of the fund return, and invest in the fund, if it is sufficiently
likely that the mutual fund manager is good. The manager will choose the riskiness of
his to-be-observed portfolio retiun in order to maximize the chance that the investor
will invest with him.
We obtained the following results. Under some conditions on the parameters of
our model, the investor will invest in the fimd, if the realized return falls within some
interval, i.e., is neither too low nor too high. A good mutual fund manager picks
a portfolio of minimal riskiness. A bad mutual fimd manager will pick a portfolio
with higher risk, "gambling" on a lucky outcome. Thus, smart investors may not
want to buy the fund with the highest returns in the past. We show also that the
implementation of a regulation limiting the extent of the gambling activity by bad
managers is not always in the interest of rational investors who react optimally to
13
managers' portfolio selection.
Our resiilts on portfolio selection by fimd managers aze consistent with those of
Carhart (1997) on the lack of persistence in performances by mutual fiinds. Hence,
investment advisors making recommendations on the basis of fimds' past returns
shoiild tell investors to choose a good performer btit not a top performer.
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Appendix
A Proofs for the two-quality case.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds in several steps. We concentrate on fuiding eqtulibria, satis-
fying o9 c ob. We will make ample use of this inequality, which obviously needs to
be verified in the end.
1. The investment decision of the investors.
The criterion (2) can be written as





9(R;a9,a6) C ~ (9)
where q(R; a9, ab ) is a qtiadratic function in R, given by
9(R;~9,Q6) - ~192 - 1b2~ R2 (1~)
`20' 20'
ÍL9 ~6 `I R } ~y - ~6 10 ~6 W (1 - T ) `I
- a9Z - o62I ~2a92 2a62~ - g~a9 1- T I
Inequality (9) is satisfied, iff
R E ~Ri(a9,aé),Rn(a9,aé)) (11)
where Rj(o9,ab) ~ Rh(o9,o6) are the two solutions to the quadratic equation
q(R; a9, ~á) - 0 (12)
The second inequality of (6) implies, that (12) only has real solutions: this
is tedious but uninteresting to check, and we therefore skip the details. Fhr-
thermore, we note that for a9 - ob, the coefficient on the lead quadratic term





l~g f F~6 - ~g~ log ~~G(1 - T)~
2 F~9 - F~6 1- w
(13)
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2. A first-order condition for the fund manager.
With (11), the objective (5) of the fimd manager with quality x- g,b can be
rewritten as
max f (a; ag , oe )
where f(O; (J9 , O6 ) is the integral
Rh(~8'ob) 1 7 2
f (~; ~ , ~') r~ e-(R-u~) I(~ )dR
g 6 - Ítl(Dy~06) GiÍQ
To find the optimum, it is t~sefiil to differentiate f with respect to o,
d-~ lI(o;Rl(ageob),Rh(ag,~b))da - v
where I(v; R~, Rh) is the integral
(14)
I(~;Rt,Rb) - fR ,-YS (E2 - 1)1e-`'~Zde (15)a 2~r
Standard results about normal distribtttions imply immediately that
I(v; -oo, oo) - 1(a; 0, oo) - I(a; -oo, 0) - 0 (16)
Fhrthermore, note that the integrand (e2 - 1) in (15) is negative if ~ e ~c 1.
These relationships will prove usefiil in the next step.
3. When do we have a9 - o?
Fl~om the preceeding analysis, we see that (14) is solved at a- o, if
I(o;Ri(a9,aé),Rn(~9,aé)) c 0
for all 0 1 a. With ( 16) and the remazk following it, it is straightforward
to check, that this is the case if R~ G ps C Rh. This in turn is true iff
q(p.~; 09, ob ) c 0. For x- g, this can be rewritten as
)- (il9 -b~b)2
10 1 ab
W(1 n~)~ ~ ~.4(hg -- 2a'z - g 1`a9 1- w
The second inequality of (6) is sufficient for this inequality to hold. This shows,
that a9 - a, as claimed.
Rh-Mt
16
4. When do we have o c ob c oo?
From the previous step, we deduce that we have an equilibrium with o9 - o
and ob 1 o if we can rtile rtile out ab - o via
I(a, Rt(o,?), Rn(?, ~)) 1 0 (17)
and show, that for some o~ o, we have
I(o, Ri(a, o), Rn(o, o)) c 0 (18)
An interior solution must then exist by the mean value theorem.
Inequality (17) is equivalent to ~(a) 1~6 which is in turn equivalent to the
first inequality of (6). For inequality (18), note that the integrand in eqtiation
(15) is negative for ~ e ~ c 1. Thus, (18) follows, if
-1 c R~(o,~) - Ire ~ Rn(a,a) - hn c 1a o
for some o. Rewrite this as
l~n - o c R~(?, a) G Rn(a, a) c F~n f a
which, in turn, is equivalent to
9(Irb - o, o, o) ~ 0, 9(F~b f o, a, Q) 1 0
for some a. However, inspecting (10), it is easy to see that
4(I-ib - a, ?, o) ~ o0
and
4(Ire -i- o, a, Q) ~ o0
as o-~ oo, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Follow the proof of theorem 1 above, except for the last step. Instead of inequality
(17), we now get
I(?, Ri(?, ~), Rn(?, o)) c 0 (19)
as a consequence of (7). It follows that ab - o also. Finally, combine (7) and (8) to
see that R c~b. o
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B Existence of other equilibria
There are also eqtulibria stich that the investor always invests in the fund. 1~acing
through the proof above of theorem 1, one can see that such an equilibriiun will restilt,
if
q(R,o9,o6) c 0 for all R (20)
In that case, the fimd manager is indifferent between all choices for v, regardless of
his type, since his choice does not influence the probability of the investor investing
with him. So, any a9, ob satisfying (20) is an equilibrium.
Given ~i, T, ~C6i p.9 and ~, we shall now show, that such v9 and ob can always be
found, provided that
log ~~il- ~ )~ 1 0 (21)
(note that this conditions is assumed to hold also for theorems 1 and 2). To see this,
first note that (20) reqiures ab c o9. Given this inequality, {20) can be rewritten as
(~9 - p~b)2 - 2(v92 - 062) log
~(11- W))gb ~
G 0 (22)
after some algebra. Let p- a9~a6: note that we need to keep p 1 1. Rewrite
equation (22) as
(h9 - {L6)2 - 2obZ(p2 - 1) log
`~(1 ~)PI
G 0 (23)




Next, find ab Iarge enough so that inequality ( 23) is satisfied. Calculate a9 - pvb to
find an equilibrium of the desired form.
C The proof for the general case
Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose to the contrary, that there was an eqtulibrium, where the investor always
invests, if R~ R for some R. We will show, that there is some R 1 R(perhaps
requiring some sufficiently large v), so that
EnR~I~~ c W~ (24)
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which is a contradiction.
As in the proof of theorem 1, the fimd manager will maximize the probability that
R?~ via his choice of o. It is easy to check, that he will choose o- o, if p 1~
and o- d, if p C~. The posterior probability distribution therefore has the form
~n(d{r) - ~(R,Q) (ma(dl~; R, ~) fma(k; R,~))
where ma is a measiue with support [u, ~) and given by
ma(dlr; R, á) -? exp (-
(V~ 2?R)2
1~(dFr),
where mB is a measure with support [~, ~,] `and given bly
me(dlr; R, á) - 1 exp r-
(l~ - R)21
.~(dlr),2 ` 2v~ J
and where ~(R, á) is chosen so that aR is a probability measiue.
We now distinguish two cases, F~ 1 p and ~ c~a.
1. Case: ~ ~ p
Consider first the case ~~~. In that case, the measure ~ea has positive mass,
since n({~ c~) 1 0.
Note that the lead term in the exponential expression in ma is -R2~(2á2),
whereas it is -R~~(2o2) in the exponential expression for mB. Since á 1 0, it
follows that mB vanishes relative to ma as R-a oo, ó~ oo, R~ó - const..
More precisely, for any v ~ 0, one can find some suffiently large R as well as
some ir, so that for all Q 1 à, we have that
I E~R~á)ma(~~R,a)[i~] - Exa[l~l ~G V,
holding R~á - const. Fix R~á. One can see that
Eb(R,o)m~(;R~a)[!~] y Ex[{~ ~ Il G R]




2. Case: R c p
Next, consider the case R C p. In that case, the fimd manager will choose
o- o, regardless of his type ~~. Now suppose that the investor observes R- p:
note that he will invest. In that case, -
f F1e-(v-v)'I(~').~(dl~)
ExR~i~~ - fe-(v-w) I(~2)~(d~) ~ Ex~l~~ C{~ ,
(where the first inequality can be seen to hold, since the posterior piits larger
weight on smaller p's), yielding the contradiction. This contradiction does not
require the probability-zero event of exactly observing R- p: the inequality
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